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THROUGHOUT history, the Chinese city of Shanghai has been amicrocosm characterized by global phenomena such as urbaniza-
tion, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism.1 This article uses the case of
Shanghai’s imperial diasporas before and during WWI to analyze the
impact of global conflict in multiethnic port cities. Up to 1914,
Shanghai developed into a metropolis inhabited by over a million
Chinese and ten thousands of foreigners. This has inspired historians to
call early twentieth-century Shanghai “the most cosmopolitan city of
China and of the world.”2 This assertion usually refers to the relatively
peaceful coexistence of Chinese and foreigners in the treaty port.
Nevertheless, semicolonialism seems a more appropriate term to
describe their asymmetrical relations.3 As a result of imperialist
incursions into Chinese sovereign territory, foreigners occupied large*The author would like to thank his MA supervisors prof. Susan Richter and Xavier
Paulès as well as his PhD supervisor prof. Eric Vanhaute for their guidance. The author is also
grateful to Christian Henriot, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and the two anonymous referees
for their valuable suggestions.
1 For an overview of recent works on Shanghai history, see: Joshua A. Fogel, “The
Recent Boom in Shanghai Studies,” Journal of the History of Ideas 71, no. 2 (2010).
2 Christine Cornet, Le Paris de l’Orient: Présence française à Shanghaï, 1849–1946
(Boulogne-Billancourt: Musée Albert Kahn, 2002), 191; See also: Paul French, Through the
Looking Glass: China’s Foreign Journalists from Opium Wars to Mao (Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press, 2009), 101; Jeffrey N.Wasserstrom,Global Shanghai, 1850–2010: AHistory
in Fragments (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
3 Bryna Goodman, “Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a
Celebration of Transnational Urban Community,” Journal of Asian Studies 59, no. 4 (2000).
For more details on the system of and life in treaty ports, see also: Robert Bickers and Isabella
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38 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018plots of land, so-called concessions, in the heart of the city. In these
areas, technically still under Chinese sovereignty, theWestern diaspora
politically and economically dominated the Chinese majority. From
this perspective, the international diaspora of Shanghai before WWI
was far from prototypical, but rather a set of imperial diasporas, who
were part of the expansionist logic of Western powers.4
Therefore, the attribute of “cosmopolitan city”mainly fits Shanghai
because of the symbiosis of the different imperial diasporas, sharing a
similar raison d’être. Very often, claims about cosmopolitanism remain
rather vague and nostalgic. However, cosmopolitanism is not only an
abstract ideal but also concerns people’s attitudes and sociocultural
practices. It is “a way of living based on an ‘openness to all forms of
otherness’, associated with an appreciation of, and interaction with,
people from other cultural backgrounds.”5 Historians have extensively
studied this “everyday cosmopolitanism” in various urban societies,
especially port cities in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.6 In
an attempt to further operationalize the concept for historical empirical
research, Malte Fuhrmann has formulated three levels of cosmopo-
litanism in port societies.7 Cosmopolitanism points to (1) a visible
ethnic or cultural diversity in public space, (2) the capability to use and
take advantage of different languages and cultures, and (3) social
practices of conviviality creating intercultural bonds, the strictest
definition according to Fuhrmann. All three interpretations apply to
the cosmopolitanism of the Shanghai foreigners. It manifested itself not
only in a visible diversity or the presence of polyglots but also in the
willingness to share a single social space and to create an international
community, albeit totally excluding Chinese society.8Jackson, eds., Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land and Power (Abingdon: Routledge,
2016).
4 Robin Cohen,Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 68–79.
5 Daniel Hiebert, “Cosmopolitanism at the Local Level: The Development of
TransnationalNeighbourhoods,” inConceivingCosmopolitanism:Theory,Context, and Practice,
ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 212.
6 Glenda Sluga and Julia Horne, “Cosmopolitanism: Its Pasts and Practices,” Journal of
World History 21, no. 3 (2010); TimHarper and Sunil S. Amrith, “Sites of Asian Interaction:
An Introduction,” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 2 (2012): 57; Henk Driessen,
“Mediterranean Port Cities: Cosmopolitanism Reconsidered,” History and Anthropology
16, no. 1 (2005); Hervé Georgelin, La fin de Smyrne: Du cosmopolitisme aux nationalismes
(Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005); Robert Ilbert and Ilios Yannakakis, eds., Alexandria
1860–1960, The Brief Life of a Cosmopolitan Community (Alexandria: Harpocrates, 1997).
7 Malte Fuhrmann, “Meeresanrainer - Weltenbürger? Zum Verhältnis von hafen-
städtischer Gesellschaft und Kosmopolitismus,” Comparativ 17, no. 2 (2007): 15–16.
8 Shanghailanders (this is how they called themselves) only showed openness to
other Westerners in the city, not to the Chinese majority. Consequently, the scope of this
article is limited to interactions within the imperial diaspora. The multiple Sino-foreign
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sociologists have recently drawn attention to an important side effect
of the global spread of diaspora communities.9 Migrants moving to
another country often maintain a strong identification with the home
country. Scholars have called this “long-distance nationalism,” being a
“set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in
various geographical locations to a specific territory that they call their
ancestral home.”10 As a part of that identity, migrants might import
homeland conflicts into the host society. These imported conflicts have
been a long-standing research subject. A first strand of scholarship has
focused on the way the diaspora was involved in ongoing homeland
conflicts: expatriates setting up local branches of political parties,
financing armed rebellion, or being mobilized for political goals by
leaders in the country of origin.11 A second group of scholars has shifted
the focus toward the host societies. They have observed that in many
cosmopolitan cities the transportation of conflicts provoked inter-
diaspora tensions. Bahar Baser, for example, has shown that the
ongoing Turkish-Kurdish conflict has led to violent confrontations in
German and Swedish cities where migrants of both conflict parties had
to share a compact urban space.12 After Australia had witnessed dozens
of violent incidents between Croats and Serbs, Gregory Brown has
analyzed the way the communities managed to contain the inter-
diaspora conflict in the 1990s. Their strategies included avoiding
confrontation, channeling emotions verbally, and invoking possible
repercussions from host country policy makers.13
In contrast to the lively historical literature on cosmopolitanism
and migration, historians have only recently begun to explore the
phenomenon of interdiaspora violence in the past. Case studies on, for
example, the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in twentieth-
century France are worth following, to provide insight into the factorsrelationships, whether cosmopolitan or not, form a field of study on their own, with other
source material.
9 Elise Féron, “Diaspora Politics: From ‘Long Distance Nationalism’ to Autonomiza-
tion,” inMigration and Organized Civil Society: Rethinking National Policy, ed. Dirk Halm and
Zeynep Sezgin (New York: Routledge, 2013), 64.
10 Nina Glick Schiller, “Long-Distance Nationalism,” in Encyclopedia of Diasporas:
Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around theWorld, ed. Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian
Skoggard (Boston: Springer, 2005).
11 Nicholas Van Hear and Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and Conflict: Distance, Contiguity
and Spheres of Engagement,” Oxford Development Studies 45, no. 2 (2017).
12 Bahar Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2015).
13 Gregory Scott Brown, “Coping with Long-distance Nationalism: Inter-ethnic
Conflict in a Diaspora Context” (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Texas, 2004).
40 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018that historically determined interdiasporic conflicts.14 Innovative
research is coming from historians of the Great War, whose subject is a
prime example of a global conflict that was importable into host
societies all over the world. Studies on the treatment of enemy
minorities in belligerent and neutral countries have shown that, at the
outbreak of war, the presence of minorities caused nervous tensions in
multiethnic societies. In most cases, majority societies harassed enemy
nationals, as studies have revealed for Germans in Great Britain, Italy,
the United States, New Zealand, and elsewhere.15 While in those
countries the wartime relations were quite clear-cut, this article
investigates the intergroup tensions in a cosmopolitan city where
minorities of both sides resided. Shanghai distinguished itself from
other contemporary cities hosting important communities of both
belligerent parties such as Buenos Aires or Sao Paolo16 by its system of
foreign concessions. Thanks to the concessions’ relative autonomy
both from the Chinese state and the imperial power, the British,
French, and German minorities themselves had the power to decide
how the war should affect their international society.17 The analysis of
the interdiaspora relations in this complex political constellation thus
provides a historical contribution to the ongoing debates on the
cohabitation of different diasporas in a multicultural city.
To analyze the day-to-day evolution of the local intergroup
relations, this article mainly uses the German, French, and British local
dailies, as well as the correspondence of the major powers’ consulates.1814 Nathalie Debrauwere-Miller, ed., Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the Francophone World,
Routledge studies in cultural history (New York: Routledge, 2010).
15 P. P. Panayi, ed., Germans as Minorities during the First World War: A Global
Comparative Perspective (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).
16 Buenos Aires had a large European business community. However, Argentina’s
neutrality during the war and the limited political influence of the minorities prevented any
noticeable interactions or conflict. Ronald C. Newton, German Buenos Aires, 1900–1933:
Social Change and Cultural Crisis (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977), 41–42. In São
Paulo the wartime confrontation occurred between Luso-Brazilians and Teuto-Brazilians.
The French or British minority was not significant enough to create an overt German-
French or German-British animosity. See both Frederick C. Luebke, Germans in the New
World : Essays in the History of Immigration (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990);
Laurent Vidal and Tania Regina de Luca, eds., Les Français au Brésil: XIXe–XXe siècles (Paris:
Les Indes Savantes, 2011).
17 On the concessions system, see: Christine Cornet, “Système concessionnaire et police
française: un exemple original de la politique coloniale de la France à Shanghai,” in
Banquier, savant, artiste: Présences françaises en Extrême-Orient au XXe siècle, ed. Flora
Blanchon (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2005).
18 The sample consists of L’Echo de Chine (EDC), Deutsche Zeitung für China (DZC),
Der Ostasiatische Lloyd (OAL) with its local supplement Shanghaier Nachrichten (SN)
and the North China Herald (NCH) to a lesser extent. The NCH, a weekly created in 1850,
was seen as the most authoritative foreign newspaper in Shanghai thanks to the quality of its
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 41Newspapers are especially relevant to this investigation since the local
foreign-language press was the prime medium through which the
foreigners informed themselves about the war and thus had an
influence as an opinion maker. The newspapers also provided
information on local events and claimed to represent the voice of
the local community. This research will also build on previous work on
Shanghai during WWI written by Kathryn Meyer and Robert
Bickers.19 The emphasis lies on the French, British, and German
communities, because of their decisive role both in foreign Shanghai as
in the First World War.
This introduction has stressed the need for a historical approach to
the issue of imported conflicts in cosmopolitan cities. Shanghai was
presented as an exceptional city where Western minorities were in a
privileged, yet insecure position. Although controlled by foreign
powers, the French Concession and International Settlement could not
be regarded as genuine colonies. Officially Chinese territory, the
concession’s authorities had to remain neutral until China declared war
on Germany in 1917. In the next section, I will argue that on the eve of
WWI, a shared feeling of cosmopolitan solidarity superseded thesources and its high circulation (2,800 copies in 1912). The OAL took pride in its status as
oldest German newspaper in East Asia (est. 1886). In August 1914, the editors of the OAL, a
weekly, responded to the increasing demand for daily information on the war by creating the
DZC. The daily’s mission was to counter the propaganda of the Allied Shanghai press. The
French owed their EDC (est. 1897) to the initiative of local French residents and
missionaries wanting to promote French interests in the Far East. The wartime circulation of
the DZC was about 550 in Shanghai and 750 elsewhere. The EDC sold approximately 400
copies in whole China (no figures for Shanghai). Given their limited circulation, the French
and German newspapers continuously struggled to survive. The DZC quickly depended on
financial support from the German Foreign Office, while the EDC could only subsist thanks
to its integration into the printer of the French missionaries. As the only French and
German language papers of Shanghai and therefore essential propaganda organs toward the
foreign and Chinese community, the French and German diplomats were willing to secretly
sponsor them. This interdependence affected the editorial policy; during the whole war, the
editors generally defended their governments and its local representatives. Only the OAL
has been the subject to extensive research: Haikun Niu 牛海坤, 德文新报”研究,
1886–1917 (=The Research on Der Ostasiatische Lloyd, 1886–1917) (Shanghai:上海交通大
學出版社, 2012); Françoise Kreissler, L’action culturelle allemande en Chine de la fin du XIXe
siècle à la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1989). Most of
the research about the newspapers and some local events is therefore based on archival
records from the French consulate general in Shanghai (Center of Diplomatic Archives,
Nantes (cited hereafter as CADN)), from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris
(cited hereafter as FMFA) and from the German Foreign Office and the Legation in Beijing
(Political Archives of the German FO, Berlin, cited hereafter as PA AA).
19 Kathryn B. Meyer, “Splitting Apart: The Shanghai Treaty Port in Transition,
1914–1921” (PhD Thesis, Temple University, 1984); Robert Bickers, Getting Stuck in For
Shanghai: Putting the Kibosh on the Kaiser from the Bund: The British at Shanghai and the Great
War (Beijing: Penguin Group China, 2014), PDF e-book.
42 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018nationalist reflexes of the Westerners. This spirit of international
cooperation counterintuitively emerged in a context of imperialist
rivalry and rising nationalism. The second section analyzes the impact
of the war on local politics, social life, and public security by
highlighting a series of key events in Shanghai. Here, the main
argument is that the Great War had a far-reaching effect on the inter-
group relations. In a way, the “deviant” situation of imperial
cosmopolitanism was “normalized,” that is, complied with the
nationalist tendency in Europe. I argue that the public opinion
gradually dropped its cosmopolitan agenda and encouraged the division
of the foreign community along national lines. As will be shown in the
third section, the subtle balance of power in Shanghai prevented any
violent clashes or harsh measures. This only changed when in March
1917, China reluctantly broke its diplomatic relations with the
German Kaiserreich. The country finally decided to join the side of the
Allies in August of that year. In conclusion, this study clearly
demonstrates that the European communities eventually could not
shut the war out of their life, even if they wanted to. The
cosmopolitanism they cherished before the war made way for a
dominant nationalism, increasingly provoking animosity and outbursts
of violence. The process was only delayed by the specific political
constellation and the Westerners’ mutual interdependence.FOREIGN SHANGHAI
In the mid-nineteenth century, the British, Americans, and French
extorted the permission from the Chinese authorities to settle in
specific districts in Shanghai. What quickly became the International
Settlement—a fusion of the British and American concessions in
1863—and the French Concession, was meant by the Chinese
authorities to be merely an area where foreigners could live and do
commerce. Taking advantage of the weak position of the Chinese, the
foreign settlements soon provided themselves with their ownmunicipal
institutions and extensive power. The French Concession, on the one
hand, was officially ruled by the elected French Municipal Council.
However, the French consul general, who received orders from Paris,
increasingly tightened his grip on local politics. The International
Settlement, on the other hand, governed itself through an elected
body: The Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC). Moreover, the
privilege of extraterritoriality severely limited the authority of the
Chinese government. As stipulated in the Sino-foreign treaties, foreign
TABLE 1. Foreign and Chinese population in the foreign concessions of
Shanghai, 1905–1920
Census year and territory
1905 1910 1915 1920
Nationality ISa FCb IS FC IS FC IS FC
Britons 3713 109 4465 314 4822 681 5341 1044
Japanese 2157 73 3361 105 7169 218 10,215 306
Americans 991 21 940 44 1307 141 2264 549
Germans 785 47 811 148 1155 270 280 9
French 393 274 330 436 244 364 316 530
Russians 354 60 317 7 361 41 1266 210
Austro-Hungarians 158 5 102 12 123 27 – –
Other 2946 242 3210 410 3338 663 3625 914
Total foreigners 11,497 831 13,536 1476 18,519 2405 23,307 3562
Chinese 452,716 84,800 488,005 114,470 620,401 146,595 759,839 166,667
All figures are based on official local censuses: Cornet, “Système,” 64; “Volkszählung,” DZC, 25
November 1915; Virtual Shanghai, “Shanghai Municipal Council Censuses, 1865–1942,” http://
www.virtualshanghai.net/Texts/E-Library?ID=1354. Figures for Chinese inhabitants are minima,
since many of them did not register officially.
a IS, International Settlement.
b FC, French Concession.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 43nationals only had to obey the laws of their home country and
exclusively fell under its jurisdiction. In that way, for instance,
Germans in China could only be judged by a German consular court.20
In the 1910s, Shanghai counted over a million inhabitants of very
diverse origin. Three-quarters of them were not born there, coming
instead from other Chinese provinces, Europe, Japan, or the United
States. As shown in Table 1, about 21,000 foreigners from over thirty
different countries dwelt in the city at the start of thewar.Themajority of
the foreigners lived in the International Settlement, where most of the
businesses were situated. The French Concession was less densely
populated, although some foreigners preferred its quiet residential areas.
The largest group of foreign Shanghai, the Japanese, lived in their own20 Jürgen Osterhammel, “Exterritorialität,” in Das große China-Lexikon, ed. Brunhild
Staiger, Stefan Friedrich, and Hans-Wilm Schütte (Darmstadt: WBG, 2003); Marie-Claire
Bergère, “La soeur cadette,” in Le Paris de l’Orient: Présence française à Shanghaï, 1849–1946
(Boulogne-Billancourt: MuséeAlbert Kahn, 2002); Pär Cassel, “Extraterritoriality in China:
What we know and what we don’t know,” in Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land and
Power, ed. Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).
44 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018neighborhood without much contact with other foreign residents. The
British (and American) community was smaller than the Japanese,
though definitely the most influential. They shaped the social relations
and gave rhythm to daily life inside the foreign community. Moreover,
English was used as the lingua franca among foreigners of all nations. The
German community, mostly merchants, was envied for its economic
dynamism. Because of their economic power, they took part in local
politics as well. Most of them dwelled in the International Settlement,
close to their businesses, but aminority resided in theFrenchConcession.
The French formed a much smaller group of missionaries, shopkeepers,
and municipal officials mainly. Less important in number were
nationalities such as the Russians, Spaniards, Italians, Danes, Austro-
Hungarians, Ottomans, and the Belgians. Despite their visibility in the
streets, the foreigners never made up more than 1–2 percent of the total
population of Shanghai. However, they definitely formed the city’s elite,
while most of the Chinese were very poor.21WAVERING BETWEEN LONG-DISTANCE NATIONALISM AND EVERYDAY
COSMOPOLITANISM
The Chinese port city exemplifies the fact that nationalism and a
certain form of cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive. Both
forces can coexist within the same society or even within the same
person. By definition migrants are “multiple subjects”: they can be loyal
both to their homeland and to their new place of living, developing
some kind of “localized cosmopolitanism.”22 In the following
paragraphs, both the nationalist and cosmopolitan aspects of the
Shanghai identity and their underlying motivations will be analyzed.
On the one hand, the space in Shanghai’s concessions seemed
segregated along national lines, like in other multiethnic cities.
Surrounded by one million Chinese, the foreigners tried their best to
preserve their national identity. The own national community
provided a basic social network by building its own schools and
churches and founding its own clubs and associations. The British
owned the oldest and most prestigious club in town. Since 1863, the
Shanghai Club on the Bund, the emblematic street at the Huangpu
waterfront, welcomed the top of the foreign society. Two years after the21 Marie-Claire Bergère, Histoire de Shanghai (Paris: Fayard, 2002), 95–97.
22 Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory,
Context, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 45British, the Germans opened their Club Concordia. There were also
other clubs for Scottish, Americans, or Japanese. The more modest
Cercle Français was open to the lower classes of French society. As
opposed to these formal clubs, the country clubs had to give the more
wealthy foreigners the possibility to relax in a green, quiet
environment. While Germans gathered at the Deutscher Gartenklub,
the French found entertainment at the famous Cercle Sportif Français
(CSF). This kind of clubs allowed a more relaxed sociability, facilitated
through sports. There were clubs for tennis, horseback riding, rowing,
cricket, etc. In popularity, none could beat the race club, which organized
races on its own course twice a year. Culture enthusiasts could join clubs
like the Amateur Dramatic Club, the Société Dramatique, or theDeutsche
Theaterverein. Each large language community had at least one
newspaper. These newspapers, such as those used for this study, served
as a link both with fellow expatriates in China and with the mother
country to stay informed about current metropolitan affairs.23
The French were particularly attached to their own concession.
They were the only group of which the majority lived in the French
Concession (see Table 1). The French did everything to preserve the
national character of their small “colony.” To counter the British
economic and political dominance, the French assured their influence
in the field of religion, intellectual life, and entertainment. They
promoted the presence of the Catholic Church as well as the
development of theater, cinema, and books in the concession.24 The
German community regarded itself as part of a network of outposts of
the German Reich. Through its branch of the Deutsche Flottenverein,25
Shanghai was connected with other imperial diasporas across the globe.
Both in Germany and abroad, membership of the League was a means
of expressing nationalism. More generally, the Shanghai Germans
imported their flourishing club life from their home country. All these
clubs of engineers, doctors, merchants, etc. bundled in a coordinating
structure: the Deutsche Gemeinde, counting over 300 members.26
On the other hand, in a “frontier” society far away from the mother
country, the foreigners depended on each other, especially when it23 Bergère, Histoire, 107.
24 AlexanderMajor, “LeParis de l’Extrême-Orient: La ‘françité’de laConcession française
de Shanghai, 1900–1912” (MAThesis, Université de Sherbrooke, 2011), 43, 47, 56.
25 German Naval League, established in 1898 to promote the construction of a strong
German Navy.
26 “Liste des membres de la Deutsche Gemeinde pour le 2e semestre 1914,” OAL, 15
January 1915; On the German imperial diaspora, see also: Stefan Manz, Constructing a
German Diaspora: The “Greater German Empire”, 1871–1914 (New York: Routledge, 2014).
46 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018came to defending the concessions. At the end of the nineteenth
century, it was very in vogue to volunteer in a paramilitary
organization. In Shanghai, foreigners could join two urban militias,
the Shanghai Volunteer Corps for the International Settlement and the
Compagnie Française des Volontaires for the French Concession. They
were called into being to protect the settlements during a Chinese
uprising in the 1850s. Ever since, foreign Shanghai feared an invasion
of intruders more than imperialist rivalries. The Volunteer Corps was
subdivided into national companies (German, Italian, Portuguese,
American, etc.), which had their own uniforms. Nevertheless, the
different companies regularly drilled together and were all under the
command of Colonel Bray. Every drill passed in a spirit of friendly
competition. If they did not want to be defenseless against Chinese
armies, they had to cooperate and trust each other.27
In fact, identity in foreign Shanghai was defined more by class
difference than by nationality.28 Businessmen, merchants, bankers,
diplomats, doctors, lawyers, and engineers preferred not to sympathize
with middle-class shopkeepers and municipal employees. Club
membership remained a privilege of the high society. Even if these
clubs were organized in a national perspective, the elite blended easily.
The Shanghai Club counted many non-British personalities among its
members: a lot of Americans as well as dignitaries, bankers, newspaper
editors, and merchants from France, Germany, Denmark, Russia, and
Spain.29 The Club Concordia wanted to attract an international
clientele as well. Still, the CSF had the most cosmopolitan reputation
and a steadily growing membership (from 300 members in 1912 to 500
in 1917). Many foreigners easily found their way to the bar and the
tennis courts. Although its management stressed the Frenchness of the
club, symbolized by the Gallic Rooster at the entrance, the CSF saw
nothing wrong in the organization of tennis tournaments with their
colleagues of the German Garden Club.30 Music loving members of the27 Virtual Shanghai, “Shanghai Volunteer Corps Centenary Dinner held at The Royal
Hong Kong Yacht Club on Friday, 2 April 1954 – Virtual Shanghai,” Ye Olde Printerie,
http://www.virtualshanghai.net/Texts/E-Library?ID=1264; A. Raquez, Au Pays des Pagodes:
Notes de Voyage; Hongkong, Macao, Shanghai, le Houpé, le Hounan, le Kouei-tcheou
(Shanghai: Presse Orientale, 1900).
28 On the relationship between class and cosmopolitanism in a different geographical
context, see Athanasios Gekas, “Class and Cosmopolitanism: The Historiographical
Fortunes of Merchants in Eastern Mediterranean Ports,”Mediterranean Historical Review 24,
no. 2 (2009): 95–114.
29 Who’s who in the Far East (Hong Kong: China Mail, 1906–1907).
30 “L’inauguration du Cercle sportif français,” EDC, 9May 1914; “Lawn Tennis. French
and German Club Games,” NCH, 23 September 1911.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 47foreign community could enjoy the concerts of the local band, financed
by the International Settlement and the French Concession. It did not
bother the sponsors that the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra (SMO) was
led by a German conductor, Rudolf Buck. During his appointment
(1906–1919), he even recruited a few professional musicians in
Germany and Austria-Hungary.31
The cosmopolitan attitude was most widespread in the Shanghai
upper class, as social scientists also observe in other societies today.
However, the situation in schools and at church proves that the
cosmopolitanism was also shared in other layers of society.32 Since
more and more families rather than single men were arriving in
Shanghai, the foreign communities had to organize education for their
children. The Shanghai Public School (est. 1893), the Kaiser-Wilhelm-
Schule (est. 1895), of whom the name could not be more nationalist,
and theEcolemunicipale française (est.1911) all accepted foreign children
exclusively. The Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule offered education in German but
also taught French and English. Officially, the board refused to accept
more than25percentnon-Germans, inorder topreserve thenational and
racial character. Though, in reality, 57 of 127 pupils were of non-German
origin in 1913–1914. They came from Great Britain, Austria,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, etc. The same went for the French
Municipal School, where thirty-three French followed classes in French
and English together with thirty pupils from countries such as Great
Britain, theUnited States, Germany, Italy, andNorway in 1912–1913.33
Another meeting place was the St. Joseph church in the French
Concession, which was attended by all Catholics. The Germans, for
instance, were “warmly invited” via an announcement in the German
paper to join the service.TheFrench Jesuits were pragmatic enough to do
the sermon in French and English every other week.34
The curious mixture of patriotism and cosmopolitanism could at
best be seen at events in commemoration of the mother country. A31 Robert Bickers, “‘The Greatest Cultural Asset East of Suez’: The History and Politics
of the Shanghai Municipal Orchestra and Public Band, 1881–1946,” in China and the World
in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays, ed. Chi-hsiung Chang (Nankang, Taiwan:
Academia Sinica, 2001).
32 Bickers realized this in later work. Compare his findings in Getting Stuck in. with his
earlier work: “Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler
Community in Shanghai 1843–1937,” Past & Present 159 (1998).
33 French Municipal Council, Compte rendu de la gestion pour l’exercice 1913 – Budget
1914 (Shanghai: Imprimerie Municipale, 1913), 125; Manz, Constructing, 248; Barbara
Schmitt-Englert, Deutsche in China 1920–1950: Alltagsleben und Veränderungen
(Großheirath: Ostasien Verlag, 2011), 73–74.
34 “Katholischer Gottesdienst,” SN, 3 July 1914.
48 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018first example concerns national holidays. Whether it was the
celebration of the birthday of the emperor Wilhelm II or Bastille
Day, the Shanghai diaspora traditionally celebrated it with a drink for a
number of foreign officials, marine officers, and a lot of other foreign
guests. Usually, the celebrating nationals proudly shared their joy with
the rest of the foreign community. At night, the municipal band, police
officers and civilians of all nationalities marched together in a
torchlight procession.35 A second example relates to the commemora-
tion of the history of Shanghai, on which every foreigner had his
national view. For instance, a monument dedicated to the crew of the
sunken German gunboat Iltis could be found on the Bund. Although
the statue had become a nationalist symbol to the local Germans, it also
represented the Anglo-German friendship in Shanghai. As a matter of
fact, the monument was placed on the property of the British trading
firm Jardine Matheson with the latter’s explicit permission.36
All in all, the bonds of solidaritywere forged in daily life.The colonial
cosmopolitanism also found its origin in opposition to the Chinese
majority. Western foreigners shared the same feeling of cultural
superiority, cherished the same privileges of extraterritoriality and had
to face the same challenges inwhat they felt was an outpost of the British
and French colonial empire. Social practices were key. What James
Moore observed for twentieth-century Alexandria also holds true for
Shanghai: the public space organized in the concessions was a meeting
ground for all nationalities.37 They would listen to concerts in the park
together, share drinks in the bar, cooperate in local institutions, or simply
meet foreign friends in the streets of the concessions. Like inAlexandria,
the interdependence could be noticed even more in the business world.
Out of pragmatism, Britons would often partner with Germans to do
commerce inShanghai. The foreigners’ interestswere so closely knit that
the nationality of companies became blurred.38RISING NATIONALISM IN AWAR-TORN CITY
From the previous section emerges that the numerous networks
between foreigners created an “everyday cosmopolitanism.” This35 Bergère, Histoire, 109; Bickers, Getting Stuck in. Chap. I.
36 Robert Bickers, “Moving Stories: Memorialisation and its Legacies in Treaty Port
China,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 5 (2014): 838–841.
37 James Moore, “Between Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism: The Strange Death of
Liberal Alexandria,” Journal of Urban History 38, no. 5 (2012): 887–889.
38 Meyer, “Splitting,” 48; Bickers, Getting Stuck in. Chap. I.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 49profound mutual respect dimmed the nationalist sentiment, which in
Europe largely predominated.39 Remarkably, before the summer of
1914, the cosmopolitanism of Shanghai was never really criticized or
reflected upon. Only after the outbreak of war, the numerous ties
between foreigners became a subject of public discussion. In this
section, I argue that the international conflict had a deep impact on the
local social relations, drastically tipping the balance in favor of
nationalism. In times of such a major crisis, minorities, be they in São
Paulo, Izmir, or Shanghai, started to revalue their own national
identity, viewing other nationalities as fundamentally different or even
hostile.40 This cannot be a surprise, because the multiethnic breeding
ground that enhanced cosmopolitan cooperation, also provided the
best conditions for nationalist frictions. Advanced means of commu-
nication available in a port city such as the telegraph, press, and
steamships, combined with the experience of being foreign in a
multifaceted urban society could expedite the process in both ways.41
The news of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo struck
Shanghai as a distant, but impressive event. The consulates of Austria-
Hungary and Germany flew flags at half-mast immediately, although
nobody was really aware of the possible implications of themurder.42 At
the end of July, the stream of European news fostered the Shanghai
foreigners’ fear of a war in Europe. In the streets and clubs of the
concessions, people gathered to talk about the European crisis. They
were afraid of the consequences of war, which would be disastrous for
business in Shanghai. Their fear was well-founded: war broke out on
August 3, paralyzing commerce and raising import prices. The local
newspapers called on their readers to stay calm, in the interest of the
city’s cosmopolitan character. The city councils of the French and
International Settlement promised to keep the peace between their
foreign inhabitants. The efforts of newspapers and officials did not seem
unnecessary since wild rumors circulated. In the Shanghai Club and the
CSF, people believed that the German Kaiser had committed suicide.
German residents of the French Concession feared that the city39 Recently, the conference “War & Fatherland: Nations, Identities and the First World
War” (Brussels, 14–15 October 2015) extensively dealt with the issues of nationalism and
cosmopolitanism duringWWI. Conference proceedings are forthcoming. For Great Britain,
see also: Panikos Panayi, The Enemy in our Midst: Germans in Britain during the First World
War (New York: Berg, 1991).
40 Daniel Goffman, “Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port City,” in The Ottoman City
Between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and
Bruce Masters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 133.
41 Fuhrmann, “Meeresanrainer,” 25–26.
42 “Le drame de Sarajevo,” EDC, 4 July 1914.
50 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018services would cut off their access to water and electricity (which
actually happened in Tianjin’s French Concession).43
From the start, the war could not be kept out of Shanghai
completely. TheGerman and French consulates general mobilized their
available men immediately. When the Germans left the station to go
defend the German colony of Qingdao, they were acclaimed by a crowd
of 300 people singingDieWacht am Rhein and theDeutschlandlied. A few
days later, a large crowd including German friends and colleagues also
accompanied the French reservists to the quay, after having sung the
Marseillaise at the CSF. Many Britons, Austrians, and Russians were
mobilized too.44 In these first weeks, the foreign communities
patriotically admired the hundreds of young men gone to war,
regardless of the side on which they would have to fight. After
departure, the mobilized men would keep contact with their Shanghai
friends via the newspapers. These often published letters and news from
countrymen under arms.45 Some Shanghailanders were carried away by
their patriotism. According to the German press, the French had sung
the Marseillaise in front of the Club Concordia. In response, the French
newspaper reported the case of Shanghai Germans insulting France and
its citizens in public. Quickly, the German and French papers
abandoned their commitment to refrain from all controversy. Instead,
they adopted a much harder tone, still invoking the trope of
cosmopolitanism, but only as a rhetorical weapon. Cosmopolitanism
became a virtue the own side respected and the other side lacked.46
Like their colleagues in Europe, the Western journalists in
Shanghai, who were not at the front, wanted to support the war
differently. They voluntarily mobilized themselves in a certain way, to
accomplish their patriotic task of rallying public support for the war.47
The press indeed played a crucial role, since the Shanghailanders
impatiently awaited the latest news on the war in their home country.43 “Zur Lage in Shanghai,” SN, 7 August 1914; “Jusqu’où?. . .” EDC, 8 August 1914;
“Propos du jour,” EDC, 8 August 1914; “Propos du Jour,” EDC, 15 August 1914; Meyer,
“Splitting,” 59; Mathieu Gotteland, “Le rôle de la France dans le système impérial à Tianjin,
1914–1940” (paper presented at the French Colonial Historical Society Conference, Siem
Reap (Cambodia), 24 June 2014).
44 Bickers, Getting Stuck in. Chap. I; Meyer, “Splitting,” 60–61.
45 The DZC had a section about fellow Germans at the front: “Unsere Ostasiaten”.
Bickers,Getting Stuck in. is excellent on the about 200 British volunteers gone to Europe and
the friends they left behind in Shanghai.
46 “Englische und französische Kundgebungen,” SN, 21 August 1914; “Menteurs!. . .”
EDC, 29 August 1914.
47 Christian Delporte, “Journalistes et correspondants de guerre,” in Encyclopédie de la
Grande guerre, 1914–1918: Histoire et culture, ed. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Jean-
Jacques Becker (Paris: Bayard, 2013).
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 51Via telegraph and domestic newspapers, European propaganda produced
by governments and news agencies arrived in Shanghai, where it could
spread its poison, albeit slowly. Both French and German newspapers
adopted the war propaganda. Yet, whereas the former eagerly exploited
all German “atrocities” in Louvain or Reims, the latter took a more
defensive stance.48 The word use in articles of the EDC regarding local
events shows the evolution of the paper’s mentality. Before the war,
Germans were neutrally designated asAllemands. FromAugust 1914, this
was often reduced to Prussiens (Prussians), which had a bad connotation
from the Franco-Prussian War onward. The term of abuse Boche,
widespread in Europe, was used for the first time only in late 1915, in an
article on the German agent Nielsen (see below).49LOCAL POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE UNDER PRESSURE
The war between the Entente and Germany also affected the
composition of local political bodies. In September 1914, the only
German member, representing the about 270 Germans living in the
French Concession, was forced to resign from the French Municipal
Council. The official reason was the restoration of the balance between
the number of French and foreign councillors. In reality, the French
local authorities were glad to see this enemy subject removed from the
highest institution of the concession.50 In the International Settle-
ment, something similar happened. Before the war, the three most
important communities always arranged to divide the seats of the SMC
among themselves: the British got six, the Americans two, and the
Germans got one. For a few years, the director of the Deutsch-Asiatische
BankH. Figge had been the vice-chairman. However, the first elections
during the war showed that local politics obeyed the logic of war.
Instigated by the British consul general Fraser, the Allied press
campaigned against Figge. They argued that “this current war, an
abominable crime against humanity prepared, wanted and unleashed
by Germany, ma[de] it impossible to treat the municipal election of the
International Settlement from a simple municipal point of view.”51 The48 In fact, this difference in style reflected the broader tendencies in the domestic
French and German press during the war. Stéphanie Dalbin, Visions croisées franco-
allemandes de la Première Guerre mondiale: Étude de deux quotidiens; la Metzer Zeitung et l’Est
Républicain (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 246–247.
49 “Médecine pour l’Inde,” EDC, 30 October 1915.
50 “Conseil d’administrationmunicipale de la concession française,”EDC, 8August 1914.
51 “le crime abominable contre l’humanité qu’est la guerre actuelle, préparée, voulue et
déchaînée par l’Allemagne, rende impossible de traiter les élections municipales de la
52 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018campaign of dissuasion succeeded: there would never be any German
elected to the council again.52
At the start, no foreign inhabitant thought that “the war could
affect his personal situation” in Shanghai.53 Nevertheless, readings of
the local press produced their effects on the social relations. In a letter
to the editor of the DZC, a German suggested that his fellow













DecAs a citizen of Shanghai since many years, I’m in touch everyday with
almost all nations represented in this international settlement. (. . .)
[O]ur enemies, French as well as English, generally do not hesitate to
talk about the war, which they normally condemn. (. . .) Some recent
press articles have proven the fact that one finds with some people in
Shanghai a good dose of spitefulness. In general, I have found the
hatred of the English more pronounced than of the French (. . .). Since
one can never know, when and where one encounters this hatred, it
seems better for Germans to avoid the places, where enemy nationals
gather in great numbers.54A few initiatives trying to unite the whole foreign community around a
single project failed. A British woman, married to a German, wanted to
organize a charity ball in favor of all victims of war, regardless of
nationality. Her “peace treaty for a couple of hours” was destined to fail,
because the tensions between enemies had become insuperable.
Thinking of their compatriots on the battlefield and the horrifying war
stories, French and Germans alike refused to have a cheerful evening
right next to their opponents.55 For the same reasons, a lot of Germanscession internationale d’un simple point de vue municipal.” “La concession
rnationale et les élections municipales,” EDC, 23 January 1915. Unless otherwise
d, all translations are my own.
52 Instead of a German, first the Russians, then the Japanese managed to send a
esentative to the council.
53 “Français et Allemands à Changhai,” EDC, 12 December 1914.
54 “Als langjähriger Einwohner Shanghais komme ich täglich in Berührung mit fast
n Nationen, die in dieser internationalen Niederlassung vertreten sind. (. . .) [U]nsere
de, Franzosen sowohl wie Engländer, sich im Allgemeinen nicht scheuen, das Gespräch
den Krieg zu bringen, den sie mit nur wenigen Ausnahmen verdammen. (. . .) Das in
nghai auch eine gute Portion Gehässigkeit bei Manchem anzutreffen ist, haben unter
erem einige Zeitungsartikel in den letzten Tagen bewiesen. Im Allgemeinen habe ich
.) den Hass eher bei den Engländern als bei den Franzosen ausgesprochen gefunden. Da
nie wissen kann, wann und wo man solchemHass begegnet, so scheint es mir geraten zu
, dass der Deutsche die Stätten meidet, wo Angehörige der feindlichen Nationen sich in
serer Zahl sammeln.” H., “Stimmungen in Shanghai,” DZC, 3 September 1914.
55 “Au jour le jour,” EDC, 12 December 1914; “Ein ‘Wohltätigkeitsball’,” DZC, 24
ember 1914.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 53campaigned against the organization of the horse races in wartime.
However, some did not see why they had to change their habits and
refused to hazard their relationship with friends belonging to the
enemy. Germans and Frenchmen continued to watch the races, not
bothered by the presence of participants belonging to enemy
countries.56
Except for the rise of prices and a nationalist revival, the war did not
make itself felt among Shanghai’s foreign citizens.57 Unlike their
countrymen in Europe, the Shanghailanders could still enjoy a
comfortable life with sports and holidays, making sure to avoid the
places with too much enemy tourists of course. On evenings, music
lovers could listen to the universal works of Handel, Beethoven, and
Bizet, played by the German musicians of the municipal orchestra. So
after a while, nationals of both the Central and Allied Powers worked
out a modus vivendi, allowing them to continue business as usual. The
contacts merely became a matter of politeness. Even on national
holidays, mutual respect prevailed. When the German community
celebrated the Kaiser’s birthday for the first time during the war, they
decided to limit decoration and flags in the French Concession to avoid
provocation.58
Although foreign Shanghai could try their best to keep the peace, it
could not control the events in the outside world. The torpedoing of
the passenger ship Lusitania by a German submarine in May 1915 dealt
a fatal blow to the relations between the foreign communities. The
death of 1201 civilians crossing the Atlantic from New York to
Liverpool shocked public opinion globally. Allied propaganda
exploited the case and spread false rumors. While in Germany
children allegedly had got a day-off from school to celebrate, the
Germans in Shanghai were said to have organized parties at the Club
Concordia and the German school.59 More than elsewhere, the
torpedoing of passenger ships heading to Europe such as the Lusitania56 P. Westendorff, “Die Herbstrennen,” DZC, 24 September 1914; H.T., “Deutsche
Pflichten,” DZC, 11 May 1915.
57 However, foreign commerce in Shanghai strongly suffered from the consequences of
nationalism. Trade with the enemy being forbidden as of 1915, British firms broke with their
German partners and tried to get their hold on the latter’s market share. This economic
warfare spread to other nations such as the United States and France (to a lesser extent).
Meyer, “Splitting.”
58 “Sommeraufenthalt,” DZC, 8 June 1915; Rudolf Buck, “Zum Beginn der
Sonntagskonzerte,” DZC, 14 November 1914; “Flaggenschmuck an Kaisers Geburtstag,”
DZC, 25 January 1915.
59 Bickers, Getting Stuck in. Chap. III.
54 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018and the Ville de la Ciotat60 traumatized foreign Shanghai. Ocean liners
were the principal means of communication for European expatriates
in Shanghai. Increasingly isolated because of the war, they had to rely
on this connection when going back to Europe, but it had now become
a potential threat.
Considering the violent anti-German riots in Moscow, Liverpool,
Johannesburg, and other cities, the Lusitania affair did not cause
incidents of the same intensity in Shanghai.61 A German and a Briton,
former business partners, caused a scene in the tram. A French woman
insulted a German-speaking Suisse family walking in the French park,
believing they were Germans. The decision of the Shanghai clubs to
kick out their German members was just another consequence, though
one with high symbolic value. If even the highly cosmopolitan elite
could not resist the nationalist temptation, the gap between the
different communities had definitely become too deep. The few dozens
of Germans, who had not yet withdrawn themselves, were thus
excluded from the Shanghai Club, the Race Club, and the CSF. The
German community was incensed about the expulsion but chose not to
cause any provocation in order to keep the “harmony” (Burgfrieden).
This defensive strategy—the Germans were now almost isolated—
resulted in a code of conduct, in which the German and Austrian-
Hungarian communities advised their members to exercise “elegant
restraint” against enemy co-inhabitants and to stay in their own circle
of friends.62
The news about the Lusitaniamight have been the immediate cause
of the complete social segregation, the underlying reason was probably
more profound. Although the conflict mainly took place in Europe,
nationals of Allied and Central Powers were personally involved, since
friends and relatives had been mobilized. As the war lasted, messages
about fallen fellow Shanghailanders also reached Shanghai, causing
much grief in the small communities. Those that stayed behind in the
concessions felt obliged to do their part of the war effort. They gave
large sums to charity funds, created to support their own soldiers,60 The FrenchmailboatVille de la Ciotatwas actually heading from East Asia toMarseille
when an Austrian submarine sunk it in the Mediterranean on Christmas Eve 1915, which
caused over eighty casualties.
61 Panayi,Germans, 13; Eric Lohr, “Patriotic Violence and the State: The Moscow Riots
of May 1915,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 3 (2003); Tilman
Dedering, “‘Avenge the Lusitania’: The Anti-German Riots in South Africa in 1915,”
Immigrants & Minorities 31, no. 3 (2013).
62 “Au jour le jour,” EDC, 15 May 1915; “Incident regrettable,” EDC, 22 May 1915;
“Shanghai clubs and German members. Important decisions reached,” NCH, 22May 1915.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 55prisoners of war, and civilians. By organizing lectures, balls, and
concerts, both sides collected huge amounts of money. In fact, the
conflict had penetrated society so much, that they regarded frequenting
shops or even doctors of enemy nationality as helping the enemy.63
From this point of view, the foreigners in Shanghai had now also been
mobilized socially. Arguably, foreign Shanghai started to resemble a
situation of “total war,” where more and more aspects of social life were
dominated by the conflict.64SPY MANIA IN THE FRENCH CONCESSION
Even if the front line was far away from the foreign settlements of
Shanghai, nationals of the belligerent states were still involved in the
military operations. Especially, the consulate generals of the Allied
Powers were cooperating to get intelligence on the activities of the
Germans in East Asia. The French consul had German subjects in his
jurisdictionwatched and letters opened. TheAllied consulates suspected
the Germans to use the concessions as the Asian nerve center for global
arms smuggling. In the end, the investigation of the local authorities led
to several cases against allegedarms traffickers, ofwhich theNielsenaffair
was themost representativeandmostmediatizedone.The lawsuit against
the German Nielsen and its accomplices provoked a media storm
opposing the German and the Allied press and hardened the public
opinion on both sides. In a sense, while no one could directly blame the
ShanghaiGermans for theLusitaniadisaster, theNielsen affairwas rooted
in the local German community and brought the war much closer to
Shanghai. If the Lusitania had already mobilized the minds, then the
Nielsen affair gave the deathblow to the respectful relations between the
foreign communities.
In the fall of 1915, Shanghai newspapers started reporting on arms
and munition traffic, involving both Chinese and Germans of
Shanghai. A German merchant, called Adolphe Nielsen, allegedly
led the operations. The allied consuls and some newspapers even
believed that the German consul general Knipping was the brain
behind the conspiracy. Reportedly, the aim of the “Boches” was to63 “En tram,” EDC, 24 February 1917.
64 Other authors have called this phenomenon a “war culture,” being “the attitude of
populations who, during several years, exclusively live in function of the war,” constantly
adapting their beliefs and behavior. Jean-Jacques Becker and Gerd Krumeich, La Grande
Guerre: Une histoire franco-allemande (Paris: Tallandier, 2008), 103.
56 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018“cause trouble in all the colonial possessions of the Allies.”65 In fact,
the allegations were not far from the truth, even though the German
newspaper completely denied the facts.66 This local arms traffic was
part of a larger undercover operation of the GermanMinistry of Foreign
Affairs. The Reich wanted to arm Indian resistance fighters, who sought
to overthrow the British colonial regime. By supporting them,
Germany wished to force the British to keep their troops in the
colonies instead of sending them to the battlefields of Europe. The
consulate general of Shanghai functioned indeed as the nerve center of
the operations in East Asia. Diplomatic documents prove that Nielsen
really worked for the consulate’s secret “Upper Office” and bought
small amounts of arms and munition to export to South-Asia. To his
Chinese accomplices, Nielsen told it was medicine that had to be
transported to India.67
Since Nielsen could not be charged directly, he escaped a trial.
This urged the French concessionary police to track him even closer
and collect evidence. In early March 1916, the French authorities got
a tip from the British consul general Fraser that there were boxes of
ammunition on Nielsen’s property in the French Concession.68 The
discovery of the shells got ample coverage in the local press. Allied
and German newspapers put considerable effort into respectively
attacking and defending the Shanghai Germans. False accusations
were rampant: on the one hand, the German consulate was said to be a
“complete war organization,” on the other hand, the French would
have set up the whole story to compromise all Shanghai Germans.69
Immediately after the shell discovery, the French press began
campaigning for the deportation of all Germans from China, “just
like General Sarrail ha[d] done in Thessaloniki.”70 If the Germans
stayed, The EDC asserted, the foreign settlements would no longer be
safe. Once again, Nielsen went unpunished. Although he lived in the65 “Médecine pour l’Inde,” EDC, 30 October 1915.
66 “Ein Waffenhandel,” DZC, 2 November 1915.
67 Secret letter from Schaller (former secretary of German Consulate in Hongkong) to
German FO, 8May 1920, R 23202, PA AA; Raj Kumar, Essays on Indian Freedom Movement
(New Delhi: Discovery, 2003), 85; Thomas G. Fraser, “Germany and Indian Revolution,
1914–18,” Journal of Contemporary History 12 (1977): 265–266.
68 Private letter from Fraser (British Consul General in Shanghai) to Naggiar (French
Consul General in Shanghai), 1 March 1916, 635PO/B/57, CADN.
69 “En pleine Bocherie!,” EDC, 11 March 1916; “Eine unverschämte Verleumdung,”
DZC, 4 March 1916.
70 “Les Allemands hors de Chine,” EDC, 11March 1916. Early 1916, the French general
Sarrail had ordered the expulsion of all enemy foreigners from Thessaloniki, that Allied
forces had occupied a few months before. Stephen Pope and Elizabeth-Anne Wheal,
Dictionary of the First World War, 2nd ed. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2003), 418.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 57French Concession, his German nationality protected him from trial
by the local French authorities. Due to the extraterritoriality
principle, only the German tribunal court could judge him. Moreover,
in times of war, the German consulate would never give up on
someone who had worked for them in the past. For want of the chief
suspect, the French authorities contented themselves with the
prosecution and conviction of his supposed accomplices.71 The
French consul general’s aim was to create a big fuss to discredit all
Germans and Austrians in Shanghai, to which the Allied press
gratefully contributed.72 During the whole trial, the foreign press
exploited the opportunity to blacken the good name of the other
newspapers, the consulates of the enemy, etc. Without any reticence
toward the foreign neighbors, the press set up public opinion against
each other. Especially the EDC depicted the Germans in Shanghai as
a criminal organization wanting to blow up the foreign settlements. To
the newspaper, the events in Shanghai were not different from all the
crimes the Germans had committed worldwide like Verdun and the
torpedoing of the Lusitania and of the Ville de La Ciotat.73
The Allied press’ focus on threats inside the foreign community
produced its effects. Like in Europe, the “spy mania” (French:
espionnite) of the newspapers was meant to promote national unity and
sharpen the patriotism of their readers.74 With success, for the
Shanghai French were frightened of this “enemy within”. French
neighbors to the German Medical School reported to the police that
Germans were holding secret conferences there and feared that they
were planning to blow up police stations. Readers of the EDC asked
what measures the French Concession would take to guarantee their
security.75 However, the demands of part of the public to take firm
action against the Shanghai Germans sharply contrasted with the
actual policy of the local leaders. The authorities seemed to adapt only
slowly to the changing mentality of their citizens, but they did increase
the pressure on enemy nationals. This discrepancy could be found at71 They both were sentenced to several months in prison. Unsurprisingly, given the war
context, archival documents of the French consulate strongly suggest that evidence had
been manipulated. Fraser to Naggiar, 20 March 1916, 635PO/B/57, CADN; Naggiar to
Conty, 21 March 1916, 635PO/A/286, CADN.
72 Naggiar to Conty (French Minister Plenipotentiary in Beijing), 6 March 1916,
635PO/A/286, CADN.
73 “L’Affaire Nielsen ou plutôt Les Complots boches contre les Alliés en Extrême-
Orient,” EDC, 25 March 1916.
74 Dalbin, Visions, 346.
75 “Des obus dans un jardin,” EDC, 11March 1916; Neighbors of the GermanMedicine
School to French police, 31 October 1916, 635PO/B/57bis, CADN.
58 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018almost every place with a large German minority. Research on other
countries such as Brazil and New Zealand has shown that public
opinion generally called for harsh measures against the Germans in
retaliation for the German attacks on civilians, thereby going much
further than what their government intended.76
After the trial, the police of the International Settlement and the
French Concession became much more nervous. They followed and
arrested any German or Austro-Hungarian who behaved in a suspect
manner. Then again, the Nielsen affair clearly illustrated the limited
possibilities the local authorities had to act against the Germans
dwelling in the concessions. Legal action against enemy nationals was
futile given their extraterritorial status. Furthermore, in whatever way
the English consul general tried to force the Municipal Council to
take harsher measures, the SMC refused to break with the long-
standing tradition of neutrality. The preservation of good relations in
the concession was more important than international politics. In the
French Concession, the situation could have been different, since the
French consul general had much more power than his English
colleague. The reality was much more complicated. A passenger on the








FebWe should not forget (. . .) that we are in a very strange situation here.
We live side by side with the Germans although they are enemies; we
stare at each other and we still cannot give each other a beating. We
are in the French Concession and we cannot expulse them. Why? The
reason is simple: we are not at home; we are in a foreign country and in
the face of the Chinese the European community always stays the
intruder, where they would like to see reasons for division: we fear the
war as well, which could easily break out in Shanghai and we
back down in the face of this alternative, which would stress out
everybody, ruin business for a while and could cost the lives of many
Frenchmen.7776 Panayi, Germans, 11–21.
77 “Il ne faut pas oublier (. . .) que nous sommes ici dans une situation très bizarre. Nous
ns côte à côte avec les Allemands bien qu’ennemis; nous nous regardons comme des
ns de faïence et nous ne pouvons cependant nous taper dessus. Nous sommes en
cession Française et nous ne pouvons les expulser. Pourquoi? La raison en est simple:
t que nous ne sommes pas chez nous; nous sommes en pays étranger et devant les Chinois
mmunauté européenne reste toujours l’intruse où ils seraient contents de voir des sujets
ivision: on craint également la guerre qui ne manquerait pas de se déchaîner à Shanghai
on recule devant cette alternative qui mettrait tout le monde sur les dents, ruinerait les
ires pour un temps et pourrait coûter la vie à beaucoup de Français.” “En tram,” EDC, 24
ruary 1917.
Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 59As long as China, still the legal sovereign on the concession’s territory,
stayed neutral, or even favorably toward the Central Powers, the French
Concessioncouldnot take firmactionagainst its enemy inhabitants.The
passenger expressed a fear shared by many: an open conflict could have
bad consequences for the position of all Europeans in China. As a result,
the FrenchMunicipality tried to keep the peace among its residents. For
example, after three Frenchmen stained and removed the German road
sign indicating theway to theGermanMedicalSchool, theFrenchpolice
apologized to the school and replaced the sign immediately.78WHEN CHINA FINALLY JOINED THE ALLIES
The year 1917 marked a turning point in the global history of the First
World War. Following the example of United States, a whole range of
non-European states joined the Allies. OnMarch 14, a month after the
United States, China decided to break off all diplomatic relations with
Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Unlike in Brazil later
that year, the break-off did not spark violent anti-German protests in
the streets of Shanghai.79 Most likely, Shanghai’s particular political
situation, that is, the precarious condition of all Europeans as
mentioned by the French passenger prevented any outbursts of this
kind. Nevertheless, the weakening of the German political situation in
China allowed much more room for maneuver to Shanghai’s foreign
authorities. Yet, due to Shanghai’s semicolonial status, the harshest
measure—deportation—had to be endorsed by the Chinese authorities,
whose approval only came after the war.
The local French authorities immediately found a pretext in the
break-off of Sino-German relations to take action. On March 17, the
French municipal police seized the buildings of the German Medical
and Engineering School (Deutsche Medizin- und Ingenieurschule für
Chinesen). Due to the extension of the French Concession in 1914, the
terrains of the school had changed from Chinese to French-
administered territory. At this occasion, the French and German
consuls general had agreed that the French Municipality could not
enter the school without permission nor intervene in its internal affairs.
Yet, from the first war years onward, the French consulate had
considered sequestering the school to install a French institution of the78Marie du Bois-Reymond, Die Deutschen und der Krieg in China, April 1918,Nachlass
Marie du Bois-Reymond, N 2055/1, Federal Archives, Berlin.
79 Luebke, Germans, 123.
60 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018same kind in its buildings.80 After bombs had been found on German
ships in the area, the French asserted that the school formed a danger to
the security of the concessions, since there were “machines able to
produce the most dangerous equipment.” Hence, a large force of sixty
armed police officers ordered the German professors and over 400
Chinese students to leave the premises.81 The seizure of the school
roused the emotions in foreign Shanghai. The wife of one of the
German professors wrote in her diary: “Enormous agitation [reigned] in
the whole city, schadenfreude among the enemies, grief and pain
among the Germans. For the first time out here, we clearly experienced
the war first hand.”82 In the next few weeks, the French police also
seized other large properties owned by Germans: the Deutscher
Gartenklub, the private estate of Dr Paulun and a private garden. The
Conseil Municipal quickly transformed the garden club into a public
park and symbolically renamed it the Verdun Gardens.83
Taking advantage of the weakened political status of the Germans
in China, the French consul general tightened his grip on the German
residents in his concession. The French authorities gave a rather loose
interpretation of Chinese declarations made after the break-off of Sino-
German relations. To the French, it was clear that the Germans lost
their extraterritorial rights, although the issue was in fact still being
negotiated. Nonetheless, from the end of March 1917, the Germans,
first of all, had to present themselves at the police station to hand in all
their arms (just like in Chinese territory). Second, no German could
live in the concession without a residence permit. Entering the
concession was only allowed to license holders and some businessmen.
Third, men were obliged to present themselves daily and women
weekly at the police station. Fourth, the enemy residents were forced to80 Naggiar to Delcassé (French Minister of Foreign Affairs), 17 July 1915, 148CPCOM/
138, FMFA; Roswitha Reinbothe, ed. Tongji-Universität in Shanghai: Dokumente zur
Gründungsgeschichte (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 438–442.
81 The Shanghai French quickly transferred the school’s equipment to their own
university, the Aurore, but awaited the end of the war to install the French-Chinese Institute
of Commerce and Industry in the classrooms. Meanwhile, the Chinese local authorities had
found vacant buildings to continue the teaching of the Chinese students. “Die Deutsche
Medizin- und Ingenieurschule,” DZC, 22 March 1917; “Fermeture de l’école de médecine
allemande,” EDC, 24March 1917; “Zur Schliessung der DeutschenMedizin- und Ingenieur-
Schule in Schanghai,” DZC, 24 March 1917; Kreissler, L’action, 147–148.
82 “Ungeheure Aufregung herrschte in der ganzen Stadt, Schadenfreude bei den
Feinden, Kummer und Schmerz bei den Deutschen. Zum ersten Mal spürten wir hier
draussen den Krieg deutlich am eigenen Leibe.” du Bois-Reymond, “Deutschen.”
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Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 61register all their belongings and hand in their title deeds.84 In reaction,
many Germans followed the advice of the DZC to escape the “French
arbitrariness” by moving from the French Concession to the
International Settlement. At the end of the year, only ten Germans
and one Austrian lived on French-administered territory, while in 1915
there were 270 and 27, respectively.85
Chinese political leaders such as Sun Yat-sen and Duan Qirui
debated their relations with Germany for another five months. Only on
the 14th of August, China officially declared war on the German
Kaiserreich and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. It immediately
terminated all agreements with these countries. Therefore, Germans
and Austrian-Hungarians lost the privilege of extraterritoriality.
Following the French measures of March 1917, all enemy male
residents now had to present themselves twice a month at the Chinese
authorities, though women and children only once per trimester. China
also licensed all German officials working in the Chinese adminis-
tration. In addition, the Chinese government shut down all German
clubs, banks, and post offices as well as all German periodicals. The
SMC adopted the Chinese measures as far as it had not implemented
them already. Given the far-reaching previous measures, nothing
changed in the French Concession.86 Such anti-German actions were
not unusual during the Great War. From 1917, Brazil did not only close
down all German-language newspapers and schools but even forbid all
public conversations in German. In the United States, it also “became
dangerous, and in some jurisdictions illegal, to speak German in
public.”87
The measures imposed by the Chinese and foreign authorities had
severe consequences for the Shanghai Germans. Following the Chinese
orders, the police of the international settlement sealed the premises of
the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the editorial office of the German
newspapers. In addition, on that same 17th of August armed police
officers closed down the Club Concordia on the Bund, the heart of
German social life. All members left the building in bewilderment and84 “Der französische Anschlag,” DZC, 26 March 1917; “Aus der französischen
Niederlassung,” DZC, 27 March 1917; “Aus der französischen Niederlassung,” DZC, 29
March 1917; “Die französische Niederlassung,” DZC, 31 March 1917; “Von der
französischen Niederlassung,” DZC, 2 April 1917.
85 “Französische Gewaltmassregeln,” DZC, 26March 1917; French Municipal Council,
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62 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018gathered at the other side of the road. In addition, a large crowd was
attracted by the sight of a strong police force. While watching the
eviction of the club members, a Frenchman in the crowd gave a
sarcastic speech, but no overt clash between Germans and other
foreigners occurred.88 Until the end of the war, Germans and Austrians
kept living in the concessions in a relatively quiet manner, although
their freedom of movement had been limited. Nielsen’s fate was worse:
having lost his extraterritoriality, he was imprisoned by the Chinese
authorities because of “political undertakings against an Allied State”
from April 1918 until deportation in 1919. Other than that, the
children were allowed to continue to go to theGerman school and even
without a club, there were enough other bars in town where Germans
could meet. Deprived of the German newspapers, the community
shared translated Swedish articles to have some ‘neutral’ information
about the war.89
The news of the Armistice reached Shanghai on the 12th of
November 1918. Ten days later, the Allied consulates and the SMC
organized extensive celebrations. Nationals of the Allied countries
could party, eat, and drink in honor of their collective victory.
Together, they paraded in front of the ex-German club, waving
cartoons of the Kaiser and German generals. Afterward, they fixed
these pictures on a wooden frame that carried the words “House of
Hohenzollern” and put fire to the whole thing. Early December, a large
group of French marines pulled down the Iltis statue, another German
symbol.90
The victory finally allowed the Allies to proceed with their plan to
deport all Germans from China, as they had managed to do in Great
Britain and Australia. From Hong Kong, a genuine British colony,
Germans were immediately expelled in 1914. Prior to the Armistice,
the delicate balance between the Western and Chinese powers in
Shanghai hindered any measures of that kind. In the meantime,
the British seized the businesses and belongings of the Germans in
the International Settlement, like the French had done in their88 “Municipal Notification No. 2461: The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, the Club
Concordia, ‘The War’ and the ‘Deutsche Zeitung für China’,” Municipal Gazette, 23 August
1917; “German Club and Newspapers,” NCH, 25 August 1917; “Fermeture du Concordia,”
EDC, 18 August 1917.
89 “Les Boches ont encore un club,” EDC, 25 August 1917; du Bois-Reymond,
“Deutschen”; List of interned Germans in Shanghai, 1918, Peking II 1581, PA AA; Nielsen
to the German Ministry for Reconstruction, 12 February 1920, R 23202, PA AA.
90 Francis Lister Hawks Pott, A Short History of Shanghai: Being an Account of the Growth
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Vandamme: Nationalism in Cosmopolitan Shanghai 63concession. This measure seriously impoverished the majority of the
Germans, except for those who managed to entrust their possessions to
Chinese friends. In the end, China complied with the request of France
and Great Britain, who wanted to break the German competition on
the Chinese market through the expulsion.91 However, China wanted
to avoid an unnecessarily severe treatment of the Germans, so it
excluded all teachers, doctors as well as all elderly and ill people from
deportation. Others escaped by hiding themselves with Chinese
friends. Nevertheless, between February and August 1919, about 2,200
Germans passed through Shanghai in order to be deported by the
British, French, and Japanese.92 In 1920, a few had already returned
(see Table 1), but reintegration in the international community proved
to be very difficult.CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the cohabitation of different imperial
diasporas in Shanghai before and during the First World War. I have
argued that the outbreak of the global armed conflict had a decisive
influence on local interdiaspora relations. In the early 20th century
the relations between Shanghailanders of different nationality were
determined by both long-distance nationalism and cosmopolitanism.
On the one hand, the Western expatriates were deeply embedded in
their own national community and maintained a strong connection
with the homeland via various means of communication. On the other
hand, thanks to the international bonds knit in business and social life,
the Shanghai French Germans and British had developed a sense of
belonging to the port city and a feeling of solidarity with other
Westerners. However, this “localized” or “everyday cosmopolitanism”
faded out after the outbreak of war, before being overrun by virulent
nationalism. Slowly but surely, a European interstate war was
transported to Shanghai and transformed into a small-scale interethnic
conflict. As I have argued, this mobilization of the minds occurred for
three reasons.
First, war operations quickly spread out over the entire globe. The
general mobilization order drew the other Shanghainese into the war as91 Meyer, “Splitting.”
92 Schmitt-Englert, Deutsche, 81; Kreissler, L’action, 25–26; Matthew Stibbe, “Enemy
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64 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, MARCH 2018their friends and family went to—and died at—the front. The more
they heard about the war, the more they felt nationalism was their
patriotic duty, even in Shanghai. Second, in this isolated semicolony
far from the home country, the Shanghai foreigners had to rely
primarily on newsprint to stay informed about the war. The local press
enthusiastically adopted the European propaganda and sought to
manipulate opinion to revive patriotism among its readers. Third, local
events disrupted the peaceful but fragile modus vivendi of the foreign
community. Fear of the “enemy within” quickly replaced mutual trust.
While in other contemporary and more recent cases interdiaspora
conflict involved widespread physical violence, the relative peace in
wartime Shanghai is striking. Although, like elsewhere in the world,
the claims of the public opinion were more extreme than the actions of
the local authorities, no violent clashes occurred. I have argued that
Shanghai’s semicolonial status mainly explains why the escalation was
delayed and contained. Power over the concessions was fragmented in
the hands of the home country, local, and Chinese governments.
Whereas France and Great Britain were at war with Germany since
1914 and took corresponding measures, their respective concessions in
Shanghai did not do anything until 1917. The political regime of the
concessions gave the foreign local authorities some power to act against
enemy subjects, but they could not openly violate the Chinese
neutrality. Only when the three administrations concurred, firm
measures could be taken. This political ambiguity froze the situation of
1914 until China declared war on Germany. Moreover, all principal
belligerent nations were represented in the city, thus constituting
a dangerous cocktail. However, they all thanked their presence to
European imperialism. In order not to undermine their position in an
increasingly anti-imperialist country, the Westerners preferred to hold
on to peaceful coexistence. An open interdiaspora conflict would have
caused the loss of all their privileges. As seen in the introduction, this
last factor was also decisive in the containment of the Serbo-Croatian
conflict in Australia.
The case of Shanghai has once again shown the complexity of inter-
diaspora relations in multiethnic urban spaces. The First World War
erupted in a globalized world, where nationals of European nation-
states could be found on six continents. Both cosmopolitan cities and
import of homeland conflicts were by-products of these entanglements.
The importation of the war into Shanghai shows that nationalism has
been a force powerful enough to instigate hatred at a very long distance.
This force has sealed the fate of cosmopolitanism in many multiethnic
cities.
